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Abstract
What makes man human is his brain. This brain is obviously different from those of nonhuman
primates. It is larger, shows hemispheric dominance and specialization, and is cytoarchitecturally
somewhat more generalized. But are these the essential characteristics that determine the
humanness of man? This paper cannot give an answer to this question for the answer is not known.
But the problem can be stated more specifically, alternatives spelled out on the basis of available
research results, and directions given for further inquiry. My theme will be that the human brain is
so constructed that man, and only man, feels the thrust to make meaningful all his experiences and
encounters. Development of this theme demands an analysis of the brain mechanisms that make
meaning–and an attempt to define biologically the process of meaning. In this pursuit of meaning a
fascinating variety of topics comes into focus: the coding and recoding operations of the brain; how
it engenders and processes information and redundancy; and, how it makes possible signs and
symbols and prepositional utterances. Of these, current research results indicate that only in the
making of propositions is man unique–so here perhaps are to be found the keynotes that compose
the theme.
Introduction
"The hippopotamus may well regard man, with his
physical weakness, emotional unpredictability, and
mental confusion as a freak.[1]
In the middle ages thinkers were trying to discover
proofs for the existence of god. Today we seem to look
for proof for the existence of man"[1]
What makes man human is his brain. This brain is obvi-
ously different from those of nonhuman primates. It is
larger), shows hemispheric dominance and specializa-
tion, and is cytoarchitecturally somewhat more general-
ized [2-6]. But are these the essential characteristics that
determine the humanness of man? This paper cannot give
an answer to this question for the answer is not known.
But the problem can be stated more specifically, alterna-
tives spelled out on the basis of available research results,
and directions given for further inquiry.
My theme will be that the human brain is so constructed
that man, and only man, feels the thrust to make mean-
ingful all his experiences and encounters. Development of
this theme demands an analysis of the brain mechanisms
that make meaning–and an attempt to define biologically
the process of meaning. In this pursuit of meaning a fasci-
nating variety of topics comes into focus: the coding and
recoding operations of the brain; how it engenders and
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processes information and redundancy; and, how it
makes possible signs and symbols and prepositional
utterances. Of these, current research results indicate that
only in the making of propositions is man unique–so here
perhaps are to be found the keynotes that compose the
theme.
My concern with meaning originated in an attempt to for-
mulate what ails the current educational process [6,7].
Education entails communication between generations.
As such, educational institutions have been set up to
transmit information. Our schools have rightly been occu-
pied with problems of information storage and retrieval:
what ought to be taught in what period of time and how
it is to be demonstrably retrieved. But, it seems this is not
enough. From those whom we try to educate we hear rum-
blings and even shouts of discontent–discontent which
arises at least in part from our failure to meet an educa-
tional need. What might this be? Is the mere acquisition
of information insufficient? May the accumulation of
information even be a cause of the problem? Is it not
imperative to attempt to impart something additional,
something which makes information meaningful?
Information measurement theory provides an interesting
starting point for inquiry into this question. In an organ-
ism endowed with memory the acquisition of informa-
tion can, on occasion, actually lead to an increase in
uncertainty. Take for instance, a family. The wife is at
home, her husband away on a trip, and two children are
in college. Her husband informs her that he will call on
Thursday, her birthday. Letters from the children give the
additional information that they also will call. When the
phone rings the wife experiences an amount of uncer-
tainty equivalent to the amount of information she was
given initially. She can reduce her uncertainty by obtain-
ing more "information"- asking who's calling. But note
that though at the moment of the call the answer to her
question provides information, when the extended time
period over which the entire episode has transpired is con-
sidered, the answer is a repetition of one of the earlier
messages. Thus, over time, uncertainty is countered, not
by something novel, not by information, but by redun-
dancy, i.e., by repetition. My thesis will be that meaning–
the gerund of an old English word for intend, give pur-
pose to–is made possible by repetition. Let me spell out
this thesis, first in general, then in brain terms. Repetition
comes in many forms. Some forms, some patterns of rep-
etition, are more meaningful than others. Patterns of rep-
etition are called codes. Codes are constructed for a useful
purpose. When an organism is uncertain he has two alter-
native strategies to follow: one, he can reduce uncertainty
by seeking real novelty, i.e., information. This, as already
noted, will often bring only temporary relief because of
man's mnemonic capacity. The other strategy is to reduce
uncertainty by coding–by enhancing redundancy, repeat-
ing the familiar. This carries the penalty of boredom
unless the patterns of repetition are varied. Varying a code
turns out to be a remarkably powerful instrument for
effectively reducing uncertainty because it permits using
information in unexpected ways. From my own research I
have concluded that one of the most pervasive–perhaps
the most pervasive–of the operations of the brain is, when
the need is felt, to actively revise the patterns of redun-
dancy in which information is encoded [8]. There are sev-
eral levels of these encoding operations, each useful in its
own way. Let me first say something about what a code is
and then describe the types of codes constructed by the
brain.
What a code is
"Wonder, or radical amazement, is a way of going
beyond what is given in thing and thought. Refusing to
take anything for granted, to regard anything as
final."[1]
Not so long ago my laboratory came into the proud pos-
session of a computer. Very quickly we learned the fun of
communicating with this mechanical mentor. Our first
encounter involved twelve rather mysterious switches
which had to be set up (U) or down (D) in a sequence of
patterns, each pattern to be deposited in the computer
memory before resetting the switches. Twenty such
instructions or patterns constituted what is called the
"bootstrap" program. Only after this had been entered
could we "talk" to the computer–and it to us–via an
attached teletype. For example:
DUUUUUDDDDUD
DDDDDDDDUUDD
DUUUDDUDUUUD
DUDDUDDDUUDU
DDUDDDDUUUUU and so on.
Bootstrapping is not necessarily an occasional occurrence.
Whenever a fairly serious mistake is made–and mistakes
were made often at the beginning–the computer's control
operations are disrupted and we must start anew by boot-
strapping.
Imagine setting a dozen switches twenty times and repeat-
ing the process from the beginning every time an error is
committed. Imagine our annoyance when the bootstrap
didn't work because perhaps on the nineteenth instruc-
tion an error was made in setting the eighth switch. Obvi-
ously, this was no way to proceed.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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Computer programmers had early faced this problem and
solved it simply. Conceptually, the twelve switches are
divided into four triads and each combination of up or
down within each triad is given an Arabic numeral. Thus,
D D D became 0
D D U became 1
D U D became 2
D U U became 3
U D D became 4
U D U became 5
U U D became 6
U U U became 7
Conceptually, switching the first toggle on the right
becomes a 1, the next left becomes a 2, the next after this
a 4, and the next an 8. If more than a triad of switches had
been necessary, if, for instance, our computer had come
with sixteen switches, we should have conceptually
divided the array into quads. Thus the bootstrapping pro-
gram now consisted of a sequence of twenty patterns of
four Arabic numerals, such as:
3722
0014
3456
2215
1037 etc.
and we were surprised at how quickly those who boot-
strapped repeatedly, actually came to know the program
by heart. Certainly fewer errors were made in depositing
the necessary configurations–the entire process was
speeded and became, in most cases, rapidly routine and
habitual. Once the computer is bootstrapped it can be
talked to via a teletype in simple alphabetical terms, for
example, JMP for jump, CLA for clear the accumulator,
TAD for add, etc. But each of these mnemonic devices
merely stands for a configuration of switches. In fact, in
the computer handbook the arrangement for each mne-
monic is given in Arabic notation: e.g. CLA = 7200. This in
turn is easily translated into UUUDUDDDDDDD should
we be forced to set the switches on the computer by hand
because the teletype has gone out of commission.
In the first instance, then, programming is found to be the
art of devising codes, codes that when hierarchically
organized facilitate learning, remembering and reasoning.
The power of the coding process is not to be underesti-
mated. Should you doubt this, try next month to check
your bank statement against your record of expenditures
and do it all using Roman rather than Arabic numerals.
Can you imagine working out our national budget in the
Roman system? Next let me turn to an analysis of the
classes of codes engendered by the brain. These must
account for the existence of subjective states such as per-
ceptions and feelings; for the achievement of acts in the
organism's environment; for the construction of signs and
symbols by which organisms communicate with each
other; and for the composition of propositions, the tools
with which man reasons and has fashioned his culture.
Research on the brain mechanisms relevant to each of
these classes has in recent years yielded some fascinating
surprises (Pribram, 1971) [9]. Let me share some of these
surprises with you in the search for meaning even if at
times the connection between brain, behavior and mean-
ing will appear to be remote. My route is a deliberate one,
however, because for me: "Knowing [about meaning has
not been] due to coming upon something, naming and
explaining it. Knowing has been due to something forcing
itself on [me]." [1].
Brain function in awareness
"The experience of meaning is an experience of vital
involvement. Not an experience of a private reference of
meaning, but sharing a dimension open to all human
beings."[1]
During the past decade a series of studies initiated by
Kamiya has shown that people can discriminate their
brain states [10]. These studies use electrical signals to
indicate brain function and recordable behaviors as meas-
ures of psychological state. A subject readily acquires the
ability to discriminate the occasions when his brain is giv-
ing off alpha rhythms from those when his brain's electri-
cal activity is desynchronized. An interesting incidental
finding in these studies has been the fact that when Zen
and Yoga procedures accomplish their aims, subjects can
attain the alpha brain rhythm state at will. Kamiya's train-
ing procedures can and are being used as a short cut to
Nirvana.
More specific are some recent experiments of Libet that
have explored a well-known phenomenon [11]. Since the
demonstrations in the late 1800's by Fritsch and Hitzig
that electrical stimulation of parts of man's brain results in
movement [12], neurosurgeons have explored its entire
surface to determine what reactions such stimulations will
produce in their patients. For instance, Foerster mapped
regions in the postcentral gyrus which give rise to aware-Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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ness of one or another part of the body [13]. Thus sensa-
tions of tingling, of positioning, etc. can be produced in
the absence of any observable changes in the body part
experienced by the patient. Libet has shown that the
awareness produced by stimulation is not immediate: a
minimum of a half second and sometimes a period as
long as five seconds elapses before the patient experiences
anything. It appears that the electrical stimulation must
set up some state in the brain tissue and only when that
state has been attained does the patient experience.
What do we know about the organization of these brain
states apparently so necessary to awareness? They display
some curious properties. One would expect that when the
brain rhythms which are correlated with the subject's
report are disrupted, the behavioral functions would also
be interfered with. This is not the case. Focal epileptic dis-
charge in the postcentral gyrus and elsewhere, unless it
becomes pervasive and takes over the function of a large
part of the brain, does not seriously disrupt awareness
[14]. I have densely scattered epileptic lesions in various
areas of the nonhuman primate brain in a series of care-
fully carried out experiments and found that despite the
electrical disturbance produced, problem-solving ability
remains unimpaired provided the ability had been
acquired before electrical seizure discharge began [15-17].
(The acquisition of appropriate performances after the
discharges become established is, however, slowed
approximately fivefold.)
In short, the brain state necessary to awareness appears to
be resistant to being disrupted by local damage provided
this damage is not overly extensive. An estimate of the
limits on the extent to which disruption can take place
without undue influence on the state comes from experi-
ments involving brain tissue removals. Some 85 (or in
some experiments even more) of a neural system can be
made ineffective without seriously impairing the perform-
ances dependent on that system [18-20]. What sort of
state is it that can function effectively when only 10 or 15
percent of it remains and all of what remains need not be
concentrated in one location?
The answer is that the effective units of the state must be
distributed across the tissue involved. Each unit or small
cluster of units must be capable of performing in lieu of
the whole. Until very recently it was difficult to conceive
of such a mechanism.
But just as information processing by computer is an aid
in conceptualizing the way in which coding operations
are hierarchically constructed, so another engineering
domain helps us to understand the problem of the "dis-
tributed" state. This domain is called optical information
processing [21] because optical systems work this way; or,
holography, because each part of a recorded state can
stand in for the whole [22].
The essential characteristic of a holographic state is the
encoding of the relation among recurrences of neighbor-
ing activities. This is known technically as a spatial phase
relationship. In optics, ordinary pictures encode only the
intensity of illumination at any location; a hologram
encodes spatial phase in addition.
Holograms have many properties of interest to the brain
scientist. Foremost of these is the fact that information is
distributed in the holographic record. Thus one can take a
small part of the hologram and reconstruct from it an
image in most respects the same as that reconstructed
from the whole record. Second, a great deal of informa-
tion can be stored in one hologram. Several major compa-
nies (IBM, RCA) have been able to encode well over a
million bits in a square centimeter. Third, an entire image
can be reconstructed from a hologram when illumination
is reflected from one feature or part of the scene originally
recorded. This is the property of associative recall.
Holograms were first constructed mathematically by Den-
nis Gabor and crude reproductions were achieved [23,24].
Later they were improved immensely by illuminating the
object with a laser beam (fig. 1). Because of the similarity
of properties of the optical hologram and the facts about
the brain reviewed in the passages above, I have suggested
that one important encoding process in the brain follows
the mathematical rules of holography [25]. My laboratory
is now working on the problem of just how the hologram
is realized in neural tissue [7].
The neural hologram is a state in which information is
encoded in such a way that images can be constructed.
Although images are evanescent, they occur. Although
they cannot be directly communicated, they exist. At least
three types of images can be discerned subjectively, how-
ever, and for each a separate neural system has been iden-
tified. Images constructed by the operations of the
classical sensory systems refer to events external to the
organism [25]; images constructed by the operations of
the limbic forebrain monitor the world within [26,27];
and, images constructed by the brain's motor mechanisms
structure the achievements an organism aims to accom-
plish [9, 28]. I want now to take a look at these motor
mechanisms, for without them behavior could not occur
and we could never make our images meaningful.
The motor mechanism and acts
"The deed is the distillation of the self."[1]
Neuroscientists have engaged in a century-long contro-
versy regarding the functions of the motor cortex of theJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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brain. The view common to all protagonists has been that
this tissue serves much as does a keyboard upon which the
remainder of the brain–or the mind–constructs the melo-
dies to be executed by muscles as behavior [29]. What has
been controversial is the nature of the keyboard. Does it
encode, i.e. contain a representation of, individual mus-
cles or even parts [30,31]; or, does the keyboard encode
movements, spatial and temporal combinations of mus-
cle contractions, much as do the more complex controls
of an organ which encode chords, timbre, etc. [32,33]?
Some years ago I set out to see for myself where I stood in
this controversy. I repeated some of the classical experi-
ments and performed others. The results were surprising
and I was unable to understand them fully until very
recently when additional data from other laboratories
became available.
The first surprise came with the discovery [34] that sen-
sory nerves from both skin and muscle send signals to the
motor cortex by pathways no more circuitous than those
by which such signals reach sensory cortex (figs. 2 and 3).
If the motor cortex were indeed the final common path for
cerebral activity, a funnel, what business has it to be
informed so directly from the periphery? The problem
was compounded by a series of reports of experiments
analyzing the organization of peripheral motor control
which appeared about this time [35-37]. The results of
these experiments showed that one-third of the fibers
leaving the spinal cord destined for muscle end in muscle
receptors and have, under the experimental conditions,
no immediate influence on muscle contraction. What
happens when these fibers (called the Y system because
they are the smallest in diameter) are stimulated electri-
cally is that a change is produced in the signals going to
the spinal cord from the muscle receptors. Until these
experiments were reported it had been thought that the
signals from the muscle receptors accurately reflected the
states of contraction or relaxation of the muscles. Now it
became necessary to take into account the fact that mes-
sages from the central nervous system could influence the
muscle receptors independent of any changes produced in
the muscle. The results of both these sets of experiments
spelled the end to a simple stimulus-response model of
how the nervous system controls behavior [38]. At the
periphery the reflex arc became an untenable fiction; at
the cortex the keyboard had to give way to some more
sophisticated conception.
The second surprise regarding the motor mechanism
came with the discovery that I could remove huge
amounts of motor cortex with very little impairment of
muscle function [28]. Neither individual muscle contrac-
tions nor any particular movements were seriously altered
by the surgery. Yet something was amiss. Certain tasks
were performed with less skill despite the fact that slow
motion cinematography showed the movements neces-
sary to perform the task were executed without flaw in
other situations. My interpretation of this finding was that
behavioral acts, not muscles or movements, were encoded
in the motor cortex. An act was defined as an achievement
in the environment that could be accomplished by a vari-
ety of movements which became equivalent with respect
to the achievement. Thus a problem box could be opened
by use of a right or left hand; amputees have learned to
write with their toes. Encoded in the motor cortex are the
The information to be stored is originally present on a transparent slide in the object plane O Figure 1
The information to be stored is originally present on a transparent slide in the object plane O. It is illuminated by parallel light 
from a coherent light source L, like a laser beam. Consequently, in the image plane I one will see an image of the transparent 
object, faithful within the limitations of the optical system. We now expose a photographic plate, not in I, but in the focal plane 
F, to the light diffracted by the object. This plate, after exposure, is developed and a positive is made of it, which is put back in 
F. This filter, which has a transmission in each point proportional to the original light intensity, is called a hologram.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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determinants of problem solution and of writing–not the
particular movements involved in the performance.
What I could not fathom at the time was how the determi-
nants of an act could be encoded. Two experiments have
recently helped to clarify my perplexity. One was per-
formed by Bernstein in the Soviet Union [39]. Bernstein
photographed people clad in black leotards carrying out
preassigned tasks against black backgrounds. Patches of
white were attached to the leotards at the locations of
major joints. Examples of the tasks are hammering a nail
and running over rough terrain. Cinematography showed
only the white patches, of course. These described a run-
ning wave form which could be analyzed mathematically.
From his analysis Bernstein could predict within 2 mm.
where the next movement in the action would terminate–
where the hammer blow would fall, what level the foot-
steps would seek. It became obvious that if Bernstein
could make such a calculation, the motor cortex could
also do it. Interestingly, the equations Bernstein used were
the temporal equivalent of those which describe the holo-
gram.
The second experiment gives a clue as to which determi-
nants of acts are encoded [40]. Evarts impaled cells in the
motor cortex of monkeys with fine electrodes and
recorded the activity of these cells while the monkey
pushed a lever. Different weights were attached to the
A. Cortical response evoked by stimulation of superficial peroneal nerve Figure 2
A. Cortical response evoked by stimulation of superficial peroneal nerve. Upper trace in the postcentral "sensory" cortex; 
lower trace in the precentral "motor" cortex. Time: 10 msec. B. Same as A except that stimulus was applied to posterior tibial 
nerve. Note that the response in the "motor" cortex is practically identical to that in the "sensory"area.
These responses were obtained on sciatic stimulation after  complete resection of Cerebellum plus additional resection  of cortex of both postcentral gyri Figure 3
These responses were obtained on sciatic stimulation after 
complete resection of Cerebellum plus additional resection 
of cortex of both postcentral gyri. Upper trace, post-Central 
exposed decorticated white matter; lower trace, precentral 
cortex. Time: 2 and 10 msec. This indicates that the 
responses shown in Fig. 2 do not traverse the sensory cortex 
or the cerebellum on the way to the "motor" cortex.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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lever so that greater or lesser force had to be exerted by the
monkey in order to accomplish the task. Evarts, to his sur-
prise, found that the activity of the cortical neurons from
which he was recording varied not as a function of the
length or stretch of the muscles used to push the lever but
as a function of the force needed to perform the task.
Apparently what is encoded in the motor cortex is a repre-
sentation of the field of forces describing the conditions
necessary to achieve an action.
Now the earlier experimental results began to make sense.
The motor mechanism resembles a set of thermostats
rather than a keyboard [41]. At the periphery the receptors
are subject to a dual influence: they are sensitive to muscle
tension, which reflects the force exerted on the muscle,
and they are sensitive to signals from the central nervous
system by way of the Y fibers. This is much like the sensi-
tivity of the thermocouple in a thermostat which is com-
posed of two pieces of metal separated when cool but
which make contact with each other by expanding when
warmed. In addition to the sensitivity to temperature
change the size of the gap between the pieces of metal can
be varied by the little wheel at the top of the thermostat–
i.e. the device can be set to be more or less sensitive to
heat. There is by now a large body of evidence that the Y
motor system works by setting the muscle receptor's sen-
sitivity to changes in muscle tension [42]. There is also a
great deal of evidence that much of the brain's control
over muscle function is performed by making changes in
set, in biasing the Y system, and not in making muscles
move directly. Note that the setting device of the thermo-
stat is calibrated for temperature, that it has encoded on it
the information necessary to control the activity of the fur-
nace to reach the goal set for it and that this goal can be
met over a wide range of changes in the temperature of the
environment. Note also that the furnace need not display
any fixed rhythm of on and off–this rhythm will vary with
the environmental exigencies. In the same manner, the
brain's motor mechanism can encode the set points, the
information necessary to achieve certain acts. The brain
need not keep track of the rhythms of contraction and
relaxation of individual muscles necessary to achieve an
act any more than the thermostat needs to keep track of
the turnings on and off of the furnace.
The encoding problem is immensely simplified–only end
states need to be specified. As already noted these can be
computed by extrapolation from holographic-like equa-
tions that summarize the sequence (repetitions) of forces
(muscle tension states) exerted.
This is the manner in which the brain achieves acts. But we
are not yet arrived at meaning. Acts can be stereotyped,
routine. They can be made necessary by environmental
change, necessary merely to maintain the organism's equi-
librium in the face of such changes. No, there is more to
meaning than just action, as there is more to meaning
than just imaging. Meaning is derived when acts intend
(from the Latin intendere, to stretch toward), that is, reach
out to, thus impaling otherwise evanescent images and
keeping them from slipping away. The brain makes this
possible by constructing signs and symbols.
Signs and symbols: association or differentiation?
"Knowledge is fostered by curiosity; wisdom is fostered
by awe. Awe precedes faith; it is the root of faith."[1]
Much of my own research on nonhuman primates has
been devoted to the problem of how the brain makes pos-
sible signs and symbols. For many years I questioned
whether, in fact, nonhuman primates could construct
signs and symbols but my doubts have now been resolved
by work with two chimpanzees, one studied by the Gard-
ners at the University of Nevada [43] and one by Premack
at the University of California at Santa Barbara [44]. The
Nevada chimpanzee, named Washoe (after the county in
which Renois located), has been taught to communicate
using a sign language devised for the deaf and dumb. Ear-
lier attempts to set up a rich communicative system
between chimpanzee and man had failed. The Gardners
felt that this failure was due to the limitations of the chim-
panzee vocal apparatus and therefore decided to use a ges-
tural system instead. The system chosen, American Sign
Language, has the added feature that it is a relatively
iconic rather than a phonetic system, thus much less com-
plex in its structure than is human speech.
Washoe has learned to use approximately 150 signs. She
can string two or three signs together but not in any regu-
larly predictable order. Comparison with deaf human
children of comparable age shows marked differences in
the way in which gestural signs are used–but more of this
later. The point here is that sign making is possible for the
non-human primate.
The Santa Barbara chimpanzee, Sarah, is being trained by
an entirely different method to an entirely different pur-
pose. Premack has taken operant conditioning methods
and applied them to determine just how complex a sys-
tem of tokens can be used to guide Sarah's behavior.
Experiments performed in the 1930's had already shown
that chimpanzees will work for tokens–in fact a chimpo-
mat had been constructed for use with poker chips. The
chimpomat was an outgrowth of the delayed response
task, the indirect form of which uses a temporary token to
indicate where a piece of food (a reinforcer) is to be found
subsequently. The delayed response task had been devised
to determine whether animals and children could bridge
a temporal gap between a momentary occurrence and a
later response contingent on that occurrence. The bridge,Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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which animals and children can construct, has been vari-
ously conceptualized in terms of "ideas," "memory
traces," "short term memory organization," etc. Premack's
chimpanzee has demonstrated that behavior dependent
on tokens is not only possible but that hierarchical organ-
izations of tokens can be responded to appropriately.
In all of these experiments the crux of the problem is that
the token does not call forth a uniform response. Depend-
ing on the situation, that is, the context in which the token
appears, the token must be apprehended, carried to
another location, inserted into a machine or given to
someone, traded for another token or traded in for a
reward. Or, as in the original delayed response situation,
the token stands for a reward which is to appear in one
location at one time, another location at another time.
I shall use the term "symbols" to describe these context
dependent types of tokens to differentiate them from
"signs" which refer to events independent of the context
in which they appear. (This distinction is consonant with
that made by Chomsky, "Formal Properties of Gram-
mars," [45] and is used here to indicate that the primordia
of the rules that govern human language are rooted in
what are here called "significant" and "symbolic" proc-
esses.) There is now a large body of evidence to show that
the cortex lying between the classical sensory projection
areas in the posterior part of the brain is involved in
behavior dependent on discriminating signs and that the
frontal cortex lying anterior to the motor areas is involved
in performances dependent on symbolic processes.
The surprise came when experiments were devised to
show how these parts of the brain worked in determining
sign and symbol. The ordinary view is that progressively
more complex features are extracted or abstracted from
information relayed to the projection areas: the simpler
extractions occur in the projection areas per se, more com-
plex abstractions demand relays beyond this primary cor-
tex to adjacent stations where associations with
information from additional sources (e.g. the primary
projection areas) are made available [46]. Unfortunately
for this view there is a good deal of experimental evidence
against it.
Most direct is the fact that if progressive cortico-cortical
relays are involved in the ability to utilize signs and sym-
bols, then removals of these relays should impair the abil-
ity. This is not the case. The posterior and frontal cortices
specifically concerned in sign discrimination and in
delayed response lie some distance from the primary sen-
sory and motor areas. Complete removal of the tissue that
separates the primary areas from those involved in dis-
crimination and delayed response does not permanently
impair the performance of these tasks: Fig. 4[20,47,48].
Ergo, cortico-cortical "abstractive" relays cannot be the
mechanism at issue.
Two possibilities remain to explain the involvement of
those cortical areas remote from the primary projection
zones in discrimination and delayed response behavior.
Information may reach these areas by routes independent
of those that serve the primary projection cortex. This pos-
sibility is being actively explored in several laboratories. In
the rhesus monkey, however, there is already evidence
that these independent routes do not play the desired role:
destruction of the pathways does not lead to a deficit in
the performance of discriminations or delayed response
[49,50].
The third possibility is one that I have been seriously
exploring for the past decade and a half [51]. This alterna-
tive holds that sign and symbol are constructed by a
mechanism that originates in the cortex and operates on
the classical projection systems in some subcortical loca-
tion. Thus the effects of the functioning of the cortex
involved in signing and symbolizing are conceived to be
transmitted downstream to a locus where they can pre-
process signals projected to the primary sensory and
motor cortex. A good deal of evidence has accrued to this
third alternative. Perhaps most important is the fact that a
large portion of the pathway relays within the basal gan-
glia, motor structures of the motor mechanism of the
brain:Fig 5[52]. Sign and symbol manipulation thus
involves the same brain structures that are used by the
organism in the construction of acts. The suggestion that
derives from these anatomical facts is that signifying and
symbolizing are acts, albeit acts of a special sort.
There is, of course, a difference in the neuroanatomy
involved in signifying and that involved in symbolizing.
This difference, as well as the behavioral analysis of the
tasks involved, tells a good deal of what these behavioral
processes are all about. The pathways for signifying influ-
ence the primary sensory systems. Connections have been
traced by electrophysiological techniques as far peripheral
as the retina [53,54] and the cochlear nucleus [55], for
instance. The connections important to the symbolic
process have not as yet been determined as fully, but a
good deal of the evidence points to involvement with the
limbic systems structures on the innermost boundary of
the forebrain [56].
This connection between limbic and frontal lobe function
demands a word or two. Removal of tissue in these sys-
tems does not impair sign discrimination but does impair
performance on such tasks as delayed alternation [57-59],
discrimination reversal [60], shuttle-box-avoidance [61]
and approach-avoidance, commonly called "passive"
avoidance [62]. In all of these tasks some conflict inJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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Diagrammatic reconstruction of the brain after an essentially complete lesion of the Peristriate cortex Figure 4
Diagrammatic reconstruction of the brain after an essentially complete lesion of the Peristriate cortex. Representative cross 
sections are shown by number indicating placement on brain diagram. The monkey from whom this brain was taken retained a 
visual discrimination habit perfectly.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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Responses evoked by stimulation of the part of the temporal lobe involved in vision Figure 5
Responses evoked by stimulation of the part of the temporal lobe involved in vision. Note tracts passing through the putamen, 
one of the major motor structures in the brain. Horizontal marks indicate the location of the tip of the recording electrode 
from which the Response was photographed.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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response tendencies, conflict among sets, is at issue. The
appropriate response is context (i.e. state) dependent and
the context is varied as part of the problem presented to
the organism. Thus a set of contexts must become inter-
nalized (i.e. become brain states) before the appropriate
response can be made. Building sets of contexts depends
on a memory mechanism that embodies self-referral,
rehearsal or, technically speaking, the operation of sets of
recursive functions. (The formal properties of memory
systems of this type have been described fully by Quillian
[63]. The closed loop connectivity of the limbic systems
has always been its anatomical hallmark and makes an
ideal candidate as a mechanism for context dependency
[64,65].
As an aside, it is worth noting that much social-emotional
behavior is to a very great extent context dependent. This
suggests that the importance of the limbic formations in
emotional behavior stems not only from anatomical con-
nectivity with hypothalamic and mesencephalic structures
but also from its closed loop, self-referring circuitry. It
remains to be shown (although some preliminary evi-
dence is at hand [66,67] that the anterior frontal cortex
functions in a corticofugal relation to limbic system sig-
nals much as the posterior cortex functions to preprocess
sensory signals.
Thus signs and symbols are made by the brain's motor
mechanism operating on two classes of images–in the
case of signs those that encode sensory signals and in the
case of symbols those that monitor various states of the
central nervous system. Signs are codes invariant in their
reference to events imaged–their meaning is context free.
The meaning of symbols, on the other hand, is context
dependent and varies with the momentary state induced
in the brain by the stimulation. Both signs and symbols
convey meaning, make possible a temporal extension of
otherwise momentary occurrences.
Man shares the meaning conveyed by sign and symbol
with nonhuman animals. This form of meaning, though
perhaps more highly developed in man than in other ani-
mals, is not what makes him peculiarly human. Our
search for man's unique thrust to make all his experiences
and encounters meaningful needs to proceed to yet
another level of complexity of encoding: only man makes
propositions and reasons with them.
Propositions and reasoning: using signs 
symbolically and symbols significantly
"Man may, indeed, be characterized as a subject in
quest of a predicate, as a being in quest of a meaning of
life, of all life, not only of particular actions or single
episodes which happen now and then." [1]
A proposition is a sentence. It is made up of nouns and a
predicate. Nouns are derived from signs; nouns can be
conceived as signs used in sentences. Verbs are not so easy
to characterize. Most verbs are also derived from signs;
verbs indicate actions instead of things. Adjectives and
adverbs also display this property of signification. Thus
cow, green, grass, run, chew, stand, trough, drink, water,
are all signs depicting events and occurrences. Only when
used in sentences do these signs become nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs. What then makes a sentence?
Sentences are codes constructed by the mechanism of
predication. My hypothesis is that predication is a sym-
bolic process, i.e. it places linguistic signs into a context
dependent frame. Predication depends on the verb "is" in
its various grammatical constructions and according to
my hypothesis all basic sentences are explicitly or implic-
itly of the form "X is Y."
As a corollary, predication is conceived to be a statement
of belief. (See Ayer, 1946, pp. 8–15 and 91–93, for similar
views [68]). The maker of a proposition is communicating
his belief with regard to a relationship among signs. Thus
negation, qualification and the like are part of predica-
tion. The sentence "the boy runs" is therefore a shorthand
statement of the sentence "the boy is running" and indi-
cates certainty on the part of the speaker. "I believe the
boy is running"; "I think the boy is running"; "the boy
may or may not run" are all qualifiers on the certainty
with which the proposition is held. It is this process of
making statements of certainty of belief that is unique to
man and provides the thrust toward making experiences
and encounters meaningful. Propositions power meaning
by introducing flexibility into the relationship among
signs. A new level of coding emerges, the best formal
example of which is the alphabet. Each letter is a linguistic
sign, a context-free indicator that can be used as such–for
instance, in organizing a dictionary. The symbolic use of
the alphabet, on the other hand, provides an infinite rich-
ness of meaning through combinations of the self-same
letters where context dependent relationships now
become paramount. Thus "tap" and "pat" have different
meanings.
Man not only uses linguistic signs symbolically, he uses
linguistic symbols significantly. This he does when he rea-
sons. He takes a context dependent linguistic symbol and
for the duration of a particular purpose assigns to it a con-
text-free meaning. This is accomplished by making
explicit a set of rules governing the relationship among
linguistic symbols "for the duration." The set of rules is, of
course, a set of propositions. Algebra is probably the most
familiar formal example of reasoning.Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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The point at issue is that though animals make signs and
symbols, only man appears to use linguistic signs symbol-
ically in making propositions and linguistic symbols sig-
nificantly in reasoning. What then is different about
man's brain that makes possible a reciprocal interaction
between sign and symbol?
The common answer to this question is that man's brain
is characterized by its massive cortico-cortical connectivity
[69]. This connectivity is conceived to be quantitatively,
not qualitatively, different from that of non-human
brains. But as we have already seen, the postulated
transcortical relay mechanism of sign and symbol con-
struction does not come off well when examined in the
light of experimental evidence obtained with nonhuman
primates. Instead, signs and symbols are found to be
made by virtue of a mechanism that involves cortico-sub-
cortical connections that relay in structures hitherto con-
ceived to be motor in function. Thus if man's special
capability is due to his brain's cortico-cortical connectiv-
ity, this difference is qualitative not just quantitative.
The issue is an important one. If, in fact, the cortico-corti-
cal connectivity of man's brain proves to be the source of
his power of prepositional language and reasoning, we
have an answer to the question of what makes man
human. A great deal is being made today of this cortico-
cortical connectivity in terms of the "disconnection" syn-
dromes that result in a variety of aphasias and agnosias.
But data from the clinic are not always easy to evaluate
and misinterpretation due to unqualified preconceptions
can readily occur. I have some misgivings about the valid-
ity of the common view that cortico-cortical connections
are responsible for man's human capabilities. I cannot
now fully spell out these misgivings because they are intu-
itive and constitute the questions directing my research
plans for the immediate future. But a few points can be
made. Obviously the roots of the misgivings lie in my
experience with nonhuman brains. Initially the cortico-
cortical hypothesis seemed self-evident. Only when exper-
imental result after experimental result disconfirmed the
hypothesis was I driven to search elsewhere to make sense
of the data. However, this is not all. The cortico-cortical
connection hypothesis implies that information is trans-
mitted by the connections. The largest bundle of connect-
ing fibers, and one that has grown considerably in size
when man is compared to monkey, is the corpus callosum
which connects the two hemispheres. Yet this increase in
the connectivity between hemispheres in man has led to
hemispheric specialization, each hemisphere serving
widely different functions. The connections seem to make
it possible for the hemispheres to go their separate ways to
a large extent rather than to duplicate each other as they
do in non-human mammals [70,71].
Objections to this view of the functions of the corpus cal-
losum immediately come to mind as a result of Sperry's
fascinating split-brain patients [72]. Sperry demonstrates
that each hemisphere can be shown to control awareness
independent of the other hemisphere once the callosum
is cut. He infers from this that separate consciousnesses,
separate minds, exist in one head in these patients. The
assumption underlying this inference is that ordinarily
consciousness is of a piece and that we are always single-
minded. I challenge this assumption. Single-mindedness
is an achievement that often demands considerable effort
whether one is studying, listening during a conversation,
or driving an automobile. Sperry's patients are not unique
in being of two minds on occasion.
Other evidence that gives rise to my misgivings with the
connectionist hypothesis comes from unilateral brain
ablations that produce symptoms which are alleviated by
further brain ablation. Thus unilateral ablations of the
frontal eye-fields in monkey and man result in a tempo-
rary disregard of stimuli in the contralateral visual field
[73,74]. Such disregard does not occur if the lesion is
bilateralized. Also, unilateral occipital lobectomy in the
cat results in a homonymous hemianopia which is
relieved when the ipsilateral optic colliculus is removed
[75].
These are but straws in the wind but they prevent me from
obtaining too easy and early a closure on the problem of
what makes man human. In order that the issue can be
faced squarely, however, I must offer an alternative to the
cortico-cortical connection hypothesis. My alternative is
that man makes meaning through signs, symbols, propo-
sitions and reasoning by way of corticofugal-subcortical
connections that importantly involve the motor mecha-
nisms of the brain. I propose that man's thrust toward
meaning derives from the fact that his brain's motor
mechanisms are better developed than those of animals.
These motor mechanisms are not to be conceived, as we
have seen, merely as movers of muscles. The brain's motor
mechanisms are devices that set the sensitivity of receptors
and afferent channels, not just of muscle receptors but
those of all receptors (including eye and ear) as well.
Changes in setpoint regulate awareness and behavior. The
changes and their results can relatively simply be encoded
in brain tissue and thus serve as guides subsequently.
Conclusion
"Thinking is living and no thought is bred in an iso-
lated cell in the brain." [1]
The implications for education of this propensity of the
brain for encoding and receding its sensitivities are obvi-
ous. In order to make information meaningful we must
allow pupils to encode in terms of their own sensitivitiesJournal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration 2006, 1:13 http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/1/1/13
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which are not necessarily ours. They must be given the
opportunity to repeat the information given in such a way
that it becomes encoded in a context which makes mean-
ing for them. They must be encouraged to remake what we
give them in their own image.
This is not as difficult as it sounds. As already noted, even
young children who are deaf use signs differently from the
way Washoe the chimpanzee uses signs. Human children
spontaneously make propositions, their language is pro-
ductive (Jakobsen, 1966) [76]. All neural tissue is sponta-
neously active, nerve cells beat out electrical signals on
their own throughout life, much as does the tissue of the
heart. In man this spontaneity becomes organized early
on so that he produces propositions, makes sentences.
And then he begins to play with these sentences, receding
them into different forms and reasoning with them. Each
new batch of teenagers attests to the human proclivity for
productively receding what is given. Why not utilize this
marvelous capacity to advantage in our educational
effort?
To summarize briefly: man's brain is different in that it
makes imperative the productive use of linguistic signs
symbolically and linguistic symbols significantly. The
flexibility derived from this difference is immense. Given
the power of this flexibility man codes and recedes for fun
and profit. Every artistic endeavor, every working accom-
plishment depends for its effectiveness not only on the
information conveyed by the theme but on the variations
on that theme. Human encounter is sustained not just by
an exchange of information but by an infinite variety in
familiar communication. Animals use signs and symbols
only in special circumstances; man productively proposi-
tions all his encounters and he reasons about all his expe-
riences. Thus man and only man shows this thrust to
make meaningful his experiences and encounters: he
intends, he holds on to his images.
But this is not all. By means of the motor mechanisms of
his brain man hopefully and continuously sets and resets
his sensitivities so that his images can become actualized
in his environment both by virtue of his own behavior
and that of socially contiguous others. Man's culture
expresses these hopes, this active thrust toward meaning.
For to be human is to be incapable of stagnation; to be
human is to productively reset, reorganize, recode, and
thus to give additional meaning to what is. In short, "to be
human is to be a problem." [1].
Note
Many important aspects of the problem of the brain's cod-
ing processes are dealt with here altogether too briefly. But
the present paper will serve as a prolegomenon to a more
comprehensive study which will appear under the title
Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles
in Neuropsychology, to be published by Prentice-Hall in
1971 [9].
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